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Abstract
The most promising way of reducing water use and nutrient load in 
overburdened catchments builds on the same kind of policy New 
Zealand is developing to reduce greenhouse gas emissions: cap-and-
trade systems that operate at the water catchment level. Because 
cap-and-trade approaches are more cost-effective than other 
regulatory approaches, they allow us to do more good at less cost 
than other alternatives. Developments in smart-market technology 
and geospatial mapping allow for smart-market solutions that 
overcome barriers to success in existing trading arrangements. And, 
if initial rights allocations respect both the existing use rights of 
current users and incipient iwi water claims, they build a powerful 
constituency in favour of environmental management institutions 
that can withstand changes in government.
Keywords  cap-and-trade, smart markets, environmental economics, 
just transition, Pigovean taxation, agricultural economics
Everything is easy in the absence of scarcity. The first fishers did not need to worry about catch limits 
or who owned the fishing grounds; fish 
were in abundance, with many more left 
in the sea for each one caught. The first 
industrial coal users did not need to 
worry about global atmospheric carbon 
dioxide concentrations; the world could 
easily handle those small-scale emissions. 
And the first to pump water from the 
aquifers did not need to worry about water 
allocations; their pumping was but a drop 
in the bucket. 
But that kind of abundance rarely lasts. 
As scarcity begins to bite, new institutional 
arrangements emerge to manage it. But the 
path is rarely easy. 
In fisheries, communities develop 
traditional fishing grounds and manage 
access. When the management task extends 
beyond the near-shore waters more easily 
amenable to community self-governance, 
regulatory measures work to limit catches. 
And when the race to fish becomes yet 
more intense, tradeable quota systems 
create durable institutions with an interest 
in conservation. 
For greenhouse gases, sector-specific 
regulations around power generation or 
automotive fuel economy eventually give 
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way to comprehensive carbon pricing 
through either a carbon tax or an emissions 
trading scheme, when public opinion 
finally catches up with the science. Having 
a price on greenhouse gas emissions can 
be remarkably cost-effective, encouraging 
those most able to reduce their own 
emissions to do so. 
As scarcity bites in more places, we need 
better allocation solutions designed with 
sustainability in mind
In water, riparian rights are traditionally 
the first to emerge: ‘reasonable use’ 
standards require that your use have no 
particular effect on other users. But those 
solutions have a harder time working as 
scarcity comes to bite more strongly. In 
those cases, either other water users give 
way, or the environment does, and too 
often the cost has fallen on the latter. 
Regulatory solutions emerge to manage 
conflicting uses, but those solutions come 
at a cost. It is far too easy for water 
allocations that were determined through 
the history of use to become locked in, with 
newcomers barred from further draws. 
And regulatory policy has a difficult time 
in weighing the merits of different potential 
water uses. If two users come to a council 
with a request to draw water from an 
aquifer nearing its capacity, and there is 
only enough water for one, difficult 
decisions need to be made. 
These regulatory mechanisms for 
managing water allocation and for 
managing nutrient outflow become both 
increasingly important and increasingly 
cumbersome in catchments under very 
strong pressure. They have resulted in 
outcomes where many landowners, and 
particularly owners of Mäori-held land, are 
locked out of land use changes, even if their 
uses of water would provide far more value 
than some existing uses. 
Cap-and-trade solutions can let us do the 
most good for the environment
Far better management solutions are 
possible, bringing better environmental 
outcomes, effecting a just transition for 
those whose water uses have to change in 
response to increased scarcity, and allowing 
precious water to flow to its most highly 
valued uses in the process. Environmental 
quality is too often cast as being in conflict 
with economic growth. The system I 
propose can unlock economic value while 
doing more to protect the environment. And, 
in catchments where the environmental 
burden must drop by enough that there are 
real trade-offs against economic outcomes, 
the mechanism works to ensure that that 
improvement in environmental quality 
comes at the lowest possible cost.1 
Improvements in economic market 
design and in hydrological sciences mean 
it is now possible to build smart-market 
systems to manage fresh water at a 
catchment level.
My argument comes in three parts. 
First, I explain why smart-market systems 
are uniquely positioned to manage 
freshwater and nutrient outflow in 
catchments sufficiently large for trading to 
be effective. I then argue that political 
constraints, rather than science or 
economics, are the largest barrier to getting 
there. Finally, I argue for a way of sharing 
the burden of getting towards more 
environmentally sustainable outcomes that, 
I hope, can make it easier for New Zealand 
to implement the changes necessary to 
protect our common future. 
Why cap-and-trade? Why prices rather than 
rules?
First up, a refresher lesson in Economics 
101 and the merits of using prices in 
places where prices can work well. Prices 
and money were never really invented 
by anyone. Rather, they emerged 
spontaneously as the product of human 
interaction in response to scarcity. They 
have persisted over millennia because 
they are uniquely able to coordinate 
between humans’ infinite wants and our 
finite means. When something becomes 
relatively more scarce, whether because of 
changes in demand or changes in supply, 
the price of that thing increases. The price 
increase, as described by economist Alex 
Tabarrok, provides a signal wrapped in an 
incentive. The signal tells everyone that the 
item has become relatively more scarce; 
the incentive encourages those who find 
it easiest to avoid using the more scarce 
thing to do so. 
Imagine if we tried managing other 
scarce resources through regional council 
consenting processes. If aluminium 
became more scarce, new potential 
aluminium users would need to apply to 
council demonstrating that their use was 
consistent with the overall shortage in 
supply, potentially with the agreement of 
another user to reduce that user’s draw on 
supply. It would not work well. Instead, an 
increase in the price of aluminium 
encourages those most able to switch to tin 
to do so, and allows those who derive the 
most value from aluminium to continue 
using it. 
The point seems obvious, but is not 
nearly as intuitive as it should be – as has 
become somewhat obvious after too many 
conversations on the topic. Prices on 
carbon dioxide emissions through the 
emissions trading scheme encourage those 
most able to reduce their own greenhouse 
gas emissions to do so. While many 
motorists pay little heed to the current 
$0.07/litre ETS charge on petrol, a price on 
carbon that is comprehensive across sectors 
hardly requires each and every user in each 
and every sector to respond in the same 
way. Instead, the system reduces emissions 
in the places where emissions reductions 
are least costly. 
... allowing there to be a price on  
water would encourage conservation  
in times of scarcity, and would ensure 
that those most able to reduce their own 
use would have the strongest incentive 
to do so.
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Similarly, allowing there to be a price on 
water would encourage conservation in 
times of scarcity, and would ensure that 
those most able to reduce their own use 
would have the strongest incentive to do so. 
Of course, it is more complicated than 
that. Prices on water would work within a 
regulatory structure; they are not a 
complete substitute for regulation. But they 
are a very good way of sorting out which 
water uses should continue in times of 
scarcity, and which should abate. 
Trade beats water taxes when overuse is 
costly …
Shifting from Economics 101 to 
Environmental Economics 225, we 
find a strong general consensus that 
price mechanisms are the best way of 
dealing with environmental externalities 
like greenhouse gas emissions. Pricing 
environmental externalities is a very good 
way of encouraging everyone to consider 
the full costs of their activities. 
But there are two different ways of putting 
a price on environmental costs. Government 
can impose a tax equivalent to the external 
cost of the activity, or it can set a binding limit, 
or cap, on the total amount of the externality 
produced. The former is generally considered 
a Pigovean tax: a tax intended to internalise 
external costs. The latter, when accompanied 
by tradeable permits for the activity within 
the cap, is a cap-and-trade system. In the 
perfect world of the economics blackboard, 
the two mechanisms can yield identical 
results: any price on an activity will result in 
an equilibrium amount of that activity, so 
choosing a price is a lot like choosing a 
quantity. 
The two mechanisms differ when the 
world provides uncertainty about demand, 
and when the environmental costs of an 
activity are too sharply rising if we have got 
things wrong. 
When thinking about greenhouse gas 
emissions, we have a pretty clear idea about 
the environmental cost of each tonne 
emitted, but we are less certain about firms’ 
costs of mitigating emissions. In that case, 
simply setting a carbon tax makes the most 
sense. If we have got things wrong about 
people’s costs of avoiding emissions, and 
the per-tonne cost of emissions is flat over 
the relevant ranges, then the costs of having 
got things wrong is not too high. Or, at least, 
the costs of getting things wrong are lower 
if we pick the wrong carbon tax than if we 
pick the wrong cap on total emissions. 
When the environmental costs of an activity are 
unpriced, demand for the externality-generating 
activity will be high. Suppose that, in an early 
period, demand for the activity follows the 
schedule D. It is downward sloping: if there were 
a price on the activity, people would undertake less 
of it. The downward-sloping nature of the curve 
reflects that some agents will have higher costs 
than others for reducing their own externality-
generating activity, and that different activities 
provide different amounts of value to the acting 
agent. If the price levied on the activity were high, 
agents would find it effective to use measures to 
reduce that activity until the point that the costs 
of those measures exceeded the pollution charge.
 In the initial state, D, agents would undertake 
quantity B of the activity because there is no cost 
faced by the actor for undertaking the activity. 
Environmental costs associated with the activity 
would be Pb. The socially optimal quantity of the 
activity, A, and associated environmental cost, Pa, 
is lower than B and Pb. But the distance between 
Pa and Pb is relatively small.
 When demand for the activity increases from 
D to D’, perhaps because of a change in demand 
for the goods provided through the activity in 
question, associated environmental costs can begin 
to increase sharply. The socially optimal amount 
of the activity, C, is only somewhat lower than the 
amount F that obtains in the absence of a price on 
the externality. But the environmental cost Pf is far 
in excess of Pc.
We can now compare a cap-and-trade system 
to a pollution or water extraction charge. At 
demand level D’, an environmental charge of Pc 
per unit of the activity would result in the socially 
optimal amount, C. Similarly, setting a cap under 
a tradeable quota system of C would result in no 
more than C, and would result in a per-unit value 
of the tradeable permit of Pc. The price and 
quantity are simultaneously determined. If we have 
a lot more certainty about the curvature of the blue 
curve demonstrating the marginal environmental 
costs of the activity than we do about the location 
of the demand curve, setting a quantity cap can 
be far better than setting a pollution charge. 
Suppose a council estimated that the catchment 
could withstand no more than C amount of the 
activity, and estimated that underlying demand for 
the activity followed the initial demand curve D. If 
it set a pollution charge of Pa, it would achieve the 
optimal amount of the activity – unless demand 
were actually D’. If demand were actually D’, 
quantity E of the activity would be undertaken at 
the far higher environmental cost of Pe. Using a 
tax can be very risky where environmental costs 
can be sharply increasing in the amount of the 
activity and when demand is uncertain.
If  the council had instead set a catchment-
level cap of C when underlying demand for the 
activity were D’, the cap would be optimal. If actual 
demand were higher than D’, the trading price for 
permits would increase, but no more of the activity 
could be undertaken. If actual demand for the 
activity followed D rather than D’, the cap would 
not bind – there would be no price on the activity, 
but the excess environmental cost is relatively 
small.
While it is possible to construct a tax that 
mimics the effect of any cap on a quantity of 
output, or a cap that mimics the effect of a tax, 
caps are preferable when the environmental costs 
of overshooting an expected quantity of output are 
very high. 
Marginal
Environmental
Cost
D’: Higher demand
Quantity
D: Demand
Pf
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That, at least, is the upshot of seminal 
work by Martin Weitzman in 1974 
comparing the cases for controlling 
environmental externalities by targeting 
prices versus targeting quantities. Ideally, 
climate change would be handled through 
carbon taxes and mitigation subsidies 
rather than a cap-and-trade system. 
But water is not like carbon dioxide. If 
we picked a wrong price on greenhouse gas 
emissions and wound up with emissions a 
bit higher or lower than had been expected, 
and the cost curve relating annual 
emissions to global climate change is fairly 
linear in any year’s emissions, things are 
still pretty close to correct. The costs of 
abstracting too much water from an aquifer 
or river start rising sharply, and quickly, for 
water takes above the environmentally 
sustainable level. If the government or 
regional council set a price for water in a 
catchment that it expected would yield a 
demand for water consistent with an 
environmentally sustainable take, and if it 
got that price wrong, rivers could run dry 
in the absence of further intervention. 
In those kinds of cases, uncertainty 
about demand and reasonable certainty 
that costs escalate sharply with overuse 
mean that quantity limits make more 
sense.  
… and that is especially true when relevant 
effects are local
Weitzman’s prices versus quantities result 
depends on the relative costs of getting 
things wrong under either mechanism, 
which depends on underlying uncertainty. 
When considering New Zealand’s 
emissions in the global context, it is 
absolutely important that New Zealand 
does its part. But if forecasting failures 
mean that New Zealand set a carbon tax 
at a level a dollar per tonne lower than 
the socially optimal carbon tax, the social 
cost of that failure is rather predictable. It 
is the extra cost of the additional tonnes 
consequently emitted, less the amount 
collected in tax for those units: a dollar 
per tonne for each excess tonne. 
The social cost curve does not bend 
appreciably if New Zealand overshoots or 
undershoots its targets because New 
Zealand is a small part of a very large and 
global problem. That makes it very unlikely 
that per-unit external costs can rise 
substantially with small changes in New 
Zealand’s quantity of emissions. 
Where greenhouse gases have global 
effects, freshwater abstraction and 
pollution have effects far more sharply 
confined to a local water catchment. Almost 
by definition, a water catchment under 
substantial demand pressure is one in 
which the cost of drawing an additional 
megalitre of water from the aquifer is much 
higher than the cost of drawing the first 
megalitre, and in which the cost of the next 
tonne of effluent is far higher than the cost 
of the first tonne. It consequently becomes 
far more likely that errors in setting a water 
or nutrient tax push a catchment into parts 
of the cost curve where the social cost far 
exceeds the tax charged on the last units. 
Getting things wrong in setting prices is 
then far more likely to have adverse 
consequences. 
Nothing described thus far is 
particularly controversial among 
environmental economists. And many 
reports, from the Land and Water Forum 
and others, have pointed to the benefits of 
cap-and-trade systems. 
While cap-and-trade may be excellent 
in theory, transaction costs in trading can 
be very important. Lake Taupö’s nutrient 
management regime has seen 
disappointingly little trading. Similarly, 
transaction costs limit the potential of 
Canterbury’s Hydro Trader system, which 
allows trading of irrigation consents. 
Buyers and sellers have to find each other 
– and that can be complicated where buyers 
and sellers may vary in the time periods 
over which they wish to buy and sell water 
or nutrient allocations. 
In both cases, would-be traders need to 
undertake substantial and costly evaluation 
work demonstrating that a shift in the 
location of an activity does not increase 
the amount of burden placed on the 
catchment. It is far more like placing an 
advert in the classifieds for something that 
is very complicated to ship to different 
places than like trading shares on the NZX. 
Smart markets can make trading easier while 
building in environmental bottom lines …
Developments in smart-market technology 
and progress in mapping New Zealand’s 
hydrology, topography and geology can 
allow revolutionary change in our ways of 
managing water take and nutrients. 
Accurate mapping can allow better 
modelling of the effects of changes in the 
intensity of land use on the environment. 
Land differs in sensitivity. Cows wintered 
on hillsides near rivers have very different 
effects on the environment than the same 
cows on a flat paddock with well-draining 
soils. Those effects will also vary with the 
depth of the local aquifers and subsoil 
geology. Those complexities are an 
important reason that Taupö’s nutrient 
management system requires council 
evaluation and sign-off on trades in 
nutrient emission rights: nitrate emissions 
implicit in a proposed trade may be 
comparable, but the environmental effects 
will depend on where those emissions 
obtain. 
Similarly, the effects of drawing water 
from an aquifer can depend on the location 
of the bore. A megalitre drawn near the sea 
will differ in effect from a megalitre of 
water drawn far upstream. 
John Raffensperger and Mark Milke, an 
operations research scholar formerly of the 
University of Canterbury’s management 
science department and now with the 
Developments in smart-market 
technology and progress in mapping 
New Zealand’s hydrology, topography 
and geology can allow revolutionary 
change in our ways of managing water 
take and nutrients. 
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RAND Corporation, and a hydrological 
engineer at Canterbury, developed a smart-
market system for trading rights in water 
abstraction while respecting those 
environmental bottom lines (Raffensperger 
and Milke, 2017). The system works as 
follows. First, the underlying environmental 
constraints are set. One potential 
environmental constraint would be that no 
more water can be drawn from an aquifer 
over the medium term than flows into that 
aquifer. Another is that minimum river 
flows cannot fall below a set threshold 
during normal hydrological years. And, 
aquifer pressure at sea level must remain 
high enough to prevent saltwater incursion 
into the aquifer. 
Water users at different node points – 
spots on the map corresponding to bores 
or locations of draws from the river – use 
a computerised trading interface to tell the 
system how much water they would like to 
purchase or to sell from their existing 
allocation at different prices. If the price of 
water is very high, a water user may wish 
to sell water back into the system for others 
to use. If the price is low, that same user 
may wish instead to buy. 
The system collects all of the bids and 
asks before running a linear optimisation 
to find the set of trades that delivers the 
most overall value while making sure that 
the environmental constraints built into 
the system are respected. Users are then 
presented with the likely trading price and 
their consequent position as either buyer 
or seller. Users confirm their willingness to 
trade at those prices and trades are effected. 
The system can run as frequently as suits 
user demand, and there is no reason that 
futures markets in water allocations could 
not be established through the same system. 
Because all trading is based on users’ 
locations and the underlying hydrology is 
mapped and accounted for in the system, 
the price of water at different nodes can 
vary to reflect that it is more costly to draw 
water in some places than in others. This 
modelling then replaces the regional 
council’s role in checking that trades have 
comparable environmental effects. 
Nutrient management is more complex. 
While nitrogen has drawn greatest focus, 
phosphorus, sediment, E. coli and other 
pollutants will matter as well. And while 
drawing water from the aquifer can have 
different effects at different nodes, 
geological complexity can introduce 
substantial variation in the period over 
which nitrogen might reach a lake or 
aquifer from different properties. 
But there, too, the science has 
progressed. A team led by Clint Rissmann 
at Land and Water Science in Invercargill 
has combined fine-grained geospatial maps 
of elevation, soil type, underlying geology, 
hydrology, land cover and land use with 
data from thousands of water sample 
results to model the effects of land use 
intensity on environmental outcomes 
(Rissmann et al., 2019). 
This work can be extended to form the 
basis for nutrient management through 
smart markets. Each targeted pollutant can 
be capped within the catchment, with each 
cap providing a constraint within the linear 
programme. 
A well-developed trading system would 
not require users to separately purchase 
allocations against each cap. Instead, a 
trading interface2 would capture details of 
on-farm practice. The system would tell 
users whether those uses would require 
purchase of a greater overall quantity of 
emission permits than the user holds or 
whether the user could sell units back into 
the system. It could also provide suggestions 
for alterations of practice that could allow 
the user to either reduce the number of 
permits they might need to purchase or to 
sell more units into the system. For example, 
shifting grazing areas to exclude areas 
subject to erosion would require the 
purchase of fewer rights within the 
sediment cap. 
With accurate modelling underlying 
the trading system, the council’s role would 
shift from evaluating trades to ensure the 
comparability of effects, to auditing on-
farm practice to ensure that practice 
corresponded to the details provided into 
the system. 
… and so we face less of a trade-off between 
economic considerations and environmental 
priorities. We can have both!
Managing water abstraction and pollutants 
through smart-market systems can make 
trading far easier. Trading is important 
because it allows those who can most 
easily change their practice to reduce the 
environmental burden on a catchment to 
be the ones to do so. Changes in practice 
are rarely costless, and costs can vary 
substantially across users. 
Integrated catchment-level systems 
incorporating all substantial water uses, 
whether agricultural, industrial, 
commercial or residential,3 help ensure that 
change happens in the places where the 
costs of change are lowest. In some places, 
the price on water through the trading 
system may encourage marginal dairy 
farms to consider selling their irrigation 
rights back into the system for others to 
use if their irrigation infrastructure were 
already reaching the end of its life, and to 
shift into lower-intensity pastoral 
agriculture instead. In other places, a 
council may be encouraged to upgrade 
leaking trunk water infrastructure, or 
leaking wastewater infrastructure, to 
reduce the costs it faced in the trading 
system or to allow it to sell valuable rights 
back into the system. 
And decoupling water rights from the 
underlying land can open up still further 
opportunities. In catchments at their 
environmental limits and where no 
further water drawing consents are issued, 
historic water allocations lock in existing 
land uses. Even if a new horticultural 
operation near town could derive far 
greater value per litre of water used than 
a farm on marginal land further afield, it 
is currently simply too difficult for the 
... a trading regime allows value-
enhancing changes in land use 
while respecting and strengthening 
environmental bottom lines ... 
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current water user and the potential water 
user to effect that exchange. 
Because a trading regime allows value-
enhancing changes in land use while 
respect ing and strengthening 
environmental bottom lines, it ensures that 
there is less of an economic cost to 
achieving those environmental objectives. 
But we have to allocate to get there. 
Economic theory since the 1960s says it’s 
the tradeability of rights that matters rather 
than who has the rights ...
Tradeable rights systems require not only 
the definition of the tradeable unit; they 
also require taking a position on who is 
provided with those initial rights. Should 
rights revert to the Crown or council, 
with regular sales at auction through the 
trading system? Or should they rest with 
existing users?
The political economy of the initial 
allocation problem is non-trivial – and we 
will come to that part. Fortunately, the 
economics of the matter is far simpler. In 
short, so long as the trading system works 
well and trading is easy, the initial allocation 
of rights makes no difference to the final 
allocation of rights (Coase, 1960). If one 
potential user of water derives more value 
from that use than do other potential users, 
that user will either outbid others for the 
water, or will decline to sell water rights at 
a price anyone else is willing to pay. 
Now, the world is more complicated 
than the blackboard, and it is  commonplace 
to expect that change in farming practice 
can sometimes be generational rather than 
speedy. But, again, reasonable outcomes do 
not require that everyone respond quickly 
to the incentives provided by price signals. 
We do not condemn housing markets 
because some people would be reluctant 
to sell the house that they were born in at 
just about any price. Those who are most 
able to change are the ones incentivised to 
do so. And, under a cap-and-trade system 
with binding caps on overall use, every bit 
of use is paid for either explicitly through 
purchase or implicitly by using rather than 
selling an allocated use right. 
We should not expect large differences 
in changes in land use under cap-and-trade 
that depend on the initial rights allocation. 
If a litre of water really is more valuable if 
used by a horticulturalist near town than 
by a marginal irrigated farm farther away, 
the horticulturalist would outbid the 
irrigator for it if the Crown auctioned off 
initial rights, would purchase it from the 
irrigator if the irrigator held the initial 
right, or would fail to sell it to the irrigator 
if allocated it in the first place.
Once we recognise that the final uses of 
water among users will not vary 
considerably with the initial allocation, we 
can instead focus attention on the real 
issues in initial allocation.
... but political economy matters too. Current 
users have a stake
If we want the improved environmental 
outcomes that can obtain through better 
water management systems, then initial 
allocation decisions should be based 
on the political constraints that might 
prevent us from otherwise achieving those 
environmental goals. 
For decades, many activities have been 
undertaken by right. While irrigation and 
water draws are now managed through 
resource consenting processes, having a 
cow in a paddock has not traditionally been 
something requiring specific consent. 
Irrigation consents are of limited duration, 
but are typically renewed rather than 
expiring. And those expectations form part 
of the current prices of agricultural land. 
Work by Arthur Grimes and Andrew 
Aitken a decade ago showed that irrigated 
land could sell for up to 50% more than 
non-irrigated land; the value of water has 
not decreased since then (Grimes and 
Aitken, 2008). 
Any initial rights allocation that simply 
ceased renewing current consents or that 
expired existing consents to draw water 
would wipe substantial amounts of value, 
immediately, from the fair price of that 
land. Farms would quickly go bankrupt, 
unable both to make the mortgage 
payments on what was supposed to have 
been a land purchase that included water 
rights, and to buy those water rights 
separately. This raises two obvious and 
related problems. 
If a farm has made substantial 
investments in land and irrigation 
infrastructure based on a policy environment 
in which irrigation consents are renewable 
in near-perpetuity, and in which farms 
abiding by good environmental practice 
faced no charges for nitrogen emissions, that 
investment could easily be wiped out if 
water and effluent rights suddenly needed 
to be purchased every year. It may be 
considered morally unjust to bankrupt 
through a policy decision farms which have 
played fairly by the rules as they found them 
and complied with every environmental 
regulation they have faced.
Second, and relatedly, even if you view 
an irrigation consent as an administrative 
permission that can be withdrawn at will 
by the Crown or council, and are inclined 
to view this kind of policy change as a risk 
that should have been considered by the 
farm in the first place, not everyone feels 
that way. It would not take many television 
news specials on bankrupted farm families 
for the system to fall over, whether 
immediately or with a change in 
government. 
And the prospect of those effects can 
stymie change in the first place. Anyone 
wishing to build environmental institutions 
that can deliver good outcomes across 
several changes in government should have 
an eye on the political conditions allowing 
those institutions to be durable. Initial 
rights allocations are critically important 
in building those institutions. 
Any initial rights allocation that simply 
ceased renewing current consents or 
that expired existing consents to draw 
water would wipe substantial amounts 
of value ...
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Recognising current uses can help enable a 
just transition
Ultimately, changes in land use should be 
invariant to initial rights allocations. In 
some places that could involve substantial 
changes in land use. If some farms are viable 
only because water effectively has no price, 
we should expect land use change if water 
comes at either an explicit or an implicit cost. 
If current users’ rights are recognised 
through an appropriate allocation of initial 
rights, then anyone shifting to less 
environmentally burdensome land uses is 
immediately compensated for that change 
in land use. Their change will have been 
consequent to a sale of valuable rights into 
the trading system that can help enable a 
transition to other land uses. 
We have the opportunity, in considering 
building a better water management system 
for a cleaner environment, to work a just 
transition into the calculus at the outset 
through the allocation of initial rights. 
But current users’ rights are not the 
only ones at play.
We also have to recognise iwi rights
The case for cap-and-trade in freshwater 
management is hardly novel. Researchers 
have argued for cap-and-trade solutions 
for decades, as detailed in my recent report 
(Crampton, 2019). In water abstraction, the 
case has been clear for a rather long time. 
In nutrient management, it is only more 
recently that geophysical mapping has 
developed sufficiently to allow the kinds of 
smart markets that can work most effectively. 
Fear of triggering Treaty claims has stymied 
progress …
But the main barrier has not been in 
economic or scientific modelling. Rather, 
it is the following. Cap-and-trade systems 
require an allocation of rights, whether they 
are framed as tradeable property rights or 
tradeable administrative permissions that 
look a lot like property rights but are not 
officially considered property rights. The 
position of the government has been that 
water is unowned or, if not, is owned 
by the Crown. Any variation from that 
position has been seen as risking claims 
under Waitangi Tribunal processes. 
The more that a tradeable permission 
looks like a property right, the more likely 
it has been seen as being legally risky. And 
so fear of opening difficult and potentially 
costly cans of worms has prevented moves 
towards better freshwater management. 
Getting catchments to operate within 
sustainability limits requires moves 
towards allocation-based systems, but 
allocation means litigation. 
… but the costs of failing to address those 
claims head-on are mounting
If there exist legitimate iwi claims to water 
in particular catchments that were not 
extinguished by the Treaty, contract or 
sale, then there is a strong moral case for 
resolving those claims. But even holding 
the moral case to one side, the case for 
now resolving iwi claims, ideally through 
negotiation, is becoming pressing. 
When scarcity and environmental 
limits did not bite, perhaps it was defensible 
to pretend that water was unowned and, in 
so pretending, avoid Treaty issues. However, 
the costs of continuing to attempt to 
manage water resources through 
suboptimal regulatory vehicles is rising. 
As catchments come under increasing 
pressure, first-in allocation systems come 
at far greater economic cost as potentially 
higher-valued water uses are blocked by 
limits on further consenting. Often, that 
cost falls on the owners of Mäori-held land 
who have been late to consider dairy 
conversions and have consequently been 
locked out of water allocations. 
And attempting to manage 
environmental harms of existing uses 
through best-practice regulations that do 
not adequately recognise the heterogeneity 
of conditions across catchments means 
greater environmental cost, greater 
regulatory compliance cost, or, more likely, 
both. Cost-effectiveness in regulatory 
regimes simply matters more when the 
regulatory constraints become more 
binding. We can no longer afford to 
maintain second- or third-best 
management systems. 
A framework solution: sharing the burden
The allocation issue is difficult enough 
in catchments that are not beyond their 
environmental limits. Once we consider 
that overall catchment level burdens must 
reduce in some places, and that iwi rights 
may also need to be attended to, the issue 
becomes more difficult. Awarding rights 
to existing users based on their historic 
consents and use rights, and additional 
rights to iwi, would mean that even 
catchments that are not currently beyond 
their limits would quickly be over-
allocated relative to any environmentally 
sustainable cap.
We suggest a framework for a way 
forward.
We all benefit from more sustainable 
outcomes, so we should share the burden
The burden of reducing overall use 
rights in over-allocated catchments, or in 
catchments that would be over-allocated 
if all iwi-awarded rights were put into use, 
cannot fall on existing users alone. Doing 
so would bankrupt many and effectively 
block the implementation of a far better 
management system. Sharing the burden 
is appropriate.
That means existing water users will have to 
do their part, but so will the public as a whole
Consider a catchment where current use 
is in excess of environmentally sustainable 
limits: the catchment can sustain only 80% 
of its current burden. And suppose that, 
for the moment, there are no iwi water 
claims. 
If there exist legitimate iwi claims to 
water in particular catchments that were 
not extinguished by the Treaty, contract 
or sale, then there is a strong moral case 
for resolving those claims. 
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An allocation solution that places the 
entire burden on existing users would 
allocate to all users rights consistent with 
80% of their existing consents (for water 
abstraction) and 80% of their existing 
pollutant burden (for nutrients). Users 
unable to easily change their own practice 
would need to purchase rights through the 
system to make up the difference; users 
more easily able to change their own 
practice would sell rights through the 
system. And users would experience a loss 
in the value of their properties equivalent 
to the loss of a fifth of their existing use 
rights, less any increase in the value of 
those use rights provided through the 
ability to trade in water and nutrient rights. 
An allocation system that places the 
entire burden on the Crown would allocate 
rights to all users consistent with 100% of 
their existing use. The Crown would then 
buy back and retire rights within the 
system until the cap was achieved. Users 
most easily able to change their own 
practice would sell their rights to the 
Crown. There would be no reduction in 
the value of existing properties and would 
instead be the potential for an increase in 
value: decoupling water and nutrient rights 
from the underlying land can increase the 
value of the bundle of rights. 
A sharing of the burden would involve 
an under-allocation of rights to current 
users relative to their established rights, or 
a time limitation on awarded rights, or both, 
coupled with Crown buy-back of rights 
through the system to get the rest of the way 
to environmentally sustainable limits.4 
The proportion of the burden that 
should fall on current users relative to the 
Crown is simultaneously a question of 
politics and of values; economists are not 
well placed to adjudicate across those. If all 
of the burden falls on existing users, the 
system may not withstand a change in 
government if the required reduction in the 
environmental burden is substantial. If all 
of the burden falls on the Crown, costs to 
the Crown could prove substantial – and 
especially if substantial additional rights 
should be awarded to iwi in some 
catchments. 
My report suggests a combination of 
time-limited rights for existing water users, 
an awarding of rights to iwi that builds over 
time, and Crown buy-back of rights. 
Doing it well builds a system that can 
endure, and that can maintain a sustainable 
environment over the long term
New Zealand needs a freshwater 
management system that can withstand 
changes of government, has the buy-in of 
existing users, and makes environmental 
sustainability be in the interest of those in 
the sector. 
Cap-and-trade systems can help ensure 
that any desired improvement in 
environmental quality comes at the 
smallest possible economic cost. But they 
also build a constituency for the 
preservation of good environmental 
outcomes and better environmental 
practice. Improvements in one’s own 
environmental practice become profitable 
when a user is allowed to sell valuable 
rights back into the system. Systems can be 
more strongly self-policing if a neighbour’s 
cheating of the system means the value of 
your own rights is eroded. 
Putting town, industry, commerce and 
agriculture on the same footing by 
requiring town and country alike to be 
accountable for the environmental burden 
they impose, through the same system, 
reduces the current adversity between town 
and country. Farmers should face the same 
cost for the breach of an effluent pond as 
a town council would face for an equivalent 
discharge from a broken sewage system.
And requiring water bottlers to 
purchase water rights through the trading 
system would help in mitigating currently 
contentious decisions around consenting 
for that water use. 
We suggest that central government 
should consider developing the kind of 
cap-and-trade smart market here described 
for trial use in Canterbury. The burden of 
reducing use to sustainable limits should 
be shared between water users and the 
broader community through a combination 
of Crown purchases and retirement of 
allocations, and by a structure of initial 
allocations that reduce current users’ rights 
over time. A smart market in water 
abstraction, following the model 
established by Raffensperger and Milke, 
would require defining minimum river 
flows. Why not recognise that minimum 
river flow as the self-owning river, following 
the precedent in Whanganui, and recognise 
iwi trusteeship rights over the river as part 
of Crown–iwi negotiations?
Water management in New Zealand has 
to change. The environmental and 
economic costs of continuing with blunt 
regulatory approaches will continue to rise. 
Dealing with the issue will likely require 
the Crown to confront potential iwi claims 
over water. But the costs of failing to do so 
will only rise. We can and must do better 
for our environment, for our communities 
that rely on water use, for any legitimate 
iwi water claims that have been ignored by 
current practice, and for our future. 
1 These issues are discussed in greater depth in Crampton, 
2019.
2 The Overseer farm management system is currently being 
upgraded and could form the basis for this interface.
3 We do not expect that small residential bores would need to 
be covered by the trading system. Rather, council drawing 
consents for residential water supply would be encompassed. 
4 This mechanism is developed in more detail in Crampton, 
2019. 
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